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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1953
indicate that the execution of the will must be satisfactorily proved
before the offer of proof of its provisions will be accepted.
GusT A. LEDAxiS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Destruction of Common Law Remedies-Wife's Loss of Con-
sortium. Plaintiff's husband was injured through the negligence of his
employer; he recovered compensation under the state Workmen's
Compensation Act.' Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages
for her loss of consortium. In Ask v. S. S. Mullen, Inc.' the Court
rejected the claim, holding workmen's compensation was an exclusive
remedy since the Act provides ". . . relief for workmen, injured in
extrahazardous work, and their families and dependents'. . . and to
that end all civil actions ... for... personal injuries ... are... abol-
ished, except as in this title provided."' The wife is included in the
term "family" by previous Washington decisions.' A possibly more
emphatic basis of the decision is the provision that compensation
.... shall be in lieu of any and all rights of action whatsoever against
any person whomsoever. . . ."' The Act does provide compensation
for the wife as follows: She receives compensation in event of her
husband's death, and in case of partial or total disability the injured
workman receives greater benefits if he is married than if single.'
Since the case was of first impression the Court turned to many
other jurisdictions to support its conclusions.7 Plaintiff relied heavily
upon Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,' which permitted the wife to recover
for loss of consortium even though the applicable federal statute pro-
vides that the employer's liability under the act is to be "... exclusive
and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee,
his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of
kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such
1 RCW 51.
2 143 Wash. Dec. 319, 261 P.2d 118 (1953), noted 26 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 216 (1954).
8 RCW 51.04.010 (Italics added).
4 E.g., Collins v. Northwest Casualty Co., 180 Wash. 347, 39 P.2d 986 (1935).
5 RCW 51.32.010, a provision ignored in note, 26 RocKY MT. L. REv. 216 (1954)
which disapproves of the principle case.
a RCW 51.32.040 et seq.
7E.g., Napier v. Martin, 194 Term. 105, 250 S.W2d 35 (1952); Holder v. Elms
Hotel Co., 338 Mo. 857, 92 S.W.2d. 620 (1936) ; likewise, the husband cannot sue for
his loss of consortium, Swan v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 129 Misc. 500, 222 N. Y. Supp.
111 (1927) ; GuGse v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 403, 51 N.W.2d 24 (1952).
887 U.S. App. D.C. 57, 183 F2d 811; cert. den. 340 U.S. 852 (1950); noted 36
CORN. L. Q. 148 (1950).
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employer. . . ... The court took the view that an action for loss of
consortium was separate and independent of any action covered by
workmen's compensation, and hence was not barred by such statutes.
However, a contrary result was reached by another federal court inter-
preting the same statute." The federal statute seems even more explicit
than the Washington statute in restricting a suit for loss of consortium.
Duty of the Doctor to Inform Injured Workman of His Rights-
Limitation on Time to File Claim. Plaintiff seriously injured his leg
on the job. The company physician advised plaintiff he need not file
for compensation because the injury was not severe. Plaintiff was kept
on the payroll full time after the accident; the physician continued to
treat plaintiff after the doctor ostensibly reported him back to full
time work, though plaintiff did nothing but make coffee for fellow
workers. Defendant employer made no report of the accident to the
Department of Labor and Industries as required by RCW 51.28.010.
After a year defendant terminated plaintiff's employment. Approxi-
mately two months after the injury the company doctor told plaintiff
he had varicose veins, and that the disease was not due to the fall,
which in fact it was. Before plaintiff attempted to recover compensa-
tion the one year period of limitation for filing a claim for compensation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act expired.1 Plaintiff, in Pate
v. General Electric Co.,"2 brought a personal injury action against the
doctor and his employer for failure to inform plaintiff that he could
get benefits under the Act for the injury, claiming that as a result he
lost forever his right to compensation for his injury. " 'In other words,
the gist of plaintiff's claim for redress is not the physical injury which
he has suffered, but rather the loss of his statutory remedy to be com-
pensated therefore under the Workmen's Compensation Act.' ,'s Plain-
tiff claimed the doctor was under a statutory duty to inform him of
rights and remedies under the Act. L. 1927, c. 310, § 6 (a) reads in part,
"Where a workman is entitled to compensation under this act he shall
file with the department, his application for such, together with the
certificate of the physician who attended him, and it shall be the duty
of the physician to inform the injured workman of his rights under this
9 44 STAT. 1426, 33 U.S.C.A. § 905.
10Johnson v. U.S., 79 F.Supp. 448 (D.C. Ore. 1948), where the Court held the
compensation under the statute was an "exclusive" remedy.
11 RCW 51.28.050.
12 143 Wash. Dec. 171, 260 P.2d 901 (1953).
13 Id. at 172, 260 P.2d at 902.
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act and to lend all necessary assistance in making this application .... ""
Two issues were presented to the Court: Does a physician have a duty
to inform a workman of the procedure to file a claim, and if so, does a
workman not so informed have a right of action against a doctor who
fails to perform this duty? The Court answered the first question
negatively which disposed of the second question, holding the only
duties imposed upon the doctor were, on request of the applicant, to
supply a certificate for reporting the examination when he filed his
claim, and to explain the injury in terms of compensation under the
Act. This decision together with the statutory limitation of one year
to apply for benefits under the Act left plaintiff without remedy.
While the Court is correct in saying only the injured workman may
file a claim for his personal benefits,' the basis of plaintiff's claim was
a duty on the part of the doctor to inform plaintiff of his "rights" under
the Act, including the statutory time limit for application. Plaintiff
did not contend that the doctor should file an application for him.
Admitting ambiguity concerning what duties the statute does impose,
if any, it seems reasonable that filing a claim for compensation is itself
a right under the statute with a correlative duty on the Department
to consider the application, rather than the claim being a condition
precedent to acquiring rights.
Not at issue in this case but suggested by it is the problem of the
injured workman who seeks compensation after expiration of the
statutory limitation period for filing a claim. The Washington limita-
tion is one year after date of injury, 6 and the Court has applied this
limitation literally,"1 but it has also applied equitable principles in
extending time limits set by the Workmen's Compensation Act,'8 and
has stated the Act should be liberally interpreted." Other courts have
14 (Italics added.) RCW 21.28.020 omits the word "duty" among other changes. The
Court took cognizance of the change and based its decision on the wording of the
session law.
125 RCW 51.28.020.
1' RCW 5128.050.
17 Read v. Dept, 163 Wash. 251, 1 P.2d 234 (1931) ; Ferguson v. Dept., 168 Wash.
677, 13 P2d 623 (1932); Sandahl v. Dept., 170 Wash. 380, 16 P2d 623 (1932);
Cunningham v. Dept., 39 Wn.2d 298, 235 P2d 291 (1951); Wheaton v. Dept., 40
Wn.2d 56, 240 P.2d 567 (1952). Cf., Beels v. Dept., 178 Wash. 301, 34 P.2d 917 (1934);
Crabb v. Dept., 186 Wash. 505, 58 P.2d 1025 (1936).
is Ames v. Dept., 176 Wash. 509, 30 P.2d 239 (1934). Plaintiff wa nued, but
before filing his claim was adjudicated emotionally ill; he filed his application from a
state mental hospital. The claim was acted upon and closed; plaintiff did not appeal
therewith within sixty days as the law required. The Court held that the legislature
was aware of .equitable' principles and did not intend to forbid their application, and
that since the general statute of limitation did not run on the insane the special one
on workmen's compensation claims ought not to run.
19 Crabb v. Dept., 186 Wash. 505, 58 P.2d 1025 (1936) ; Ames v. Dept., 176 Wash.
509, 30 P.2d 239 (1934).
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found causes for extending the statutory limitation. A Pennsylvania
court stated that ". . . where a person is unintentionally deceived as
to his rights by one who has authority to act in the premises, courts
will not, if it is possible to prevent it, permit such deception to work
an injury to the innocent party . .. ," and while plaintiff must conform
to the law to secure compensation, still ". . . where a party has been
prevented from doing an act through fraud or circumstances that
amount to fraud, the court might extend the time within which to do
the act."20 This does not say extension of time to file a claim is a
matter of right but is to be determined on the facts in each case. The
standard controlling such late claims would be the reasonableness of
the delay. However, a survey of most states indicates courts generally
hold the legislative limitation period controlling and that filing within
this period is a condition precedent to having an application acted
upon.2 ' Recognizing the applicability of equitable doctrine to late
claims could combine a statutory limitation to eliminate claims obvi-
ously stale from age together with a flexible rule allowing late claims
for reasonable cause. Administrative problems should not be insuper-
able, especially in light of the fact that several state statutes provide
for late claims due to reasonable cause.2'
Employers without Employees-Right to Subscribe to Benefits-
Immunity Provision. In Latimer v. Western Machinery Exchange, "
plaintiff, a member of an informal logging partnership, went with his
partners to purchase a donkey engine from the defendant and to help
load it onto a truck. In the process a "straddle chain" disengaged from
a crane hook and struck plaintiff, who brought an action for personal
20 Horn v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 274 Pa. 42, 117 AtI. 409, 410 (1922). Quoted
approvingly in Guy v. Stoecklein Baking Co., 133 Pa. Super. 38, 1 A2d 839 (1943).
In the latter case plaintiff, relying upon his employer's statement that he would take
care of everything, did not file within the fixed time and according to the statute
plaintiff's claim was "forever barred." The court permitted a late application. This
principle was reaffirmed in Mackanitz v. Pittsburgh & West Virginia Ry. Co., 157
Pa. Super. 359, 43 A.2d 586 (1945).
21 E.g., Burke v. Industrial Commission, 368 Ill. 554, 15 N.E.2d 305 (1938)
Gavigan v. Visiting Nurses Association, 125 Conn. 290, 4 A.2d 923 (1939) ; Williams
v. Campbell Construction Co., 63 Ga. App. 381, 11 S.E.2d 233 (1940); Riccioni v.
American Cyanamid Co., 23 N. J. Super. 465, 93 A.2d 60 (1952) ; Gilbert v. Metro-
politan Utilities District of Omaha, 156 Neb. 750, 57 N.W.2d 770 (1953).
22 4 ANN. LAWS OF MASS., C. 152, § 49 (1949) ; 2 ANN. CoDE OF MD., p. 3687, art. 101
(1939). Cf., DEERING'S GEN. LAWS 1923, Act 4749, § 11 (c) (Cal.), and England,
6 Edw. VII, c. 58, § 2 (1).
23240 Wn.2d 155, 241 P.2d 923 (1952), reversed on rehearing en banc, 42 Wn.2d
756, 259 P.2d 623 (1953). A similar case arising in the same industry and reaching the
same result was Pink v. Rayonier, Inc., 40 Wn.2d 188, 242 P.2d 174 (1952), reversed
on rehearing en banc, 42 Wn.2d 768, 259 P.2d 629 (1953).
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injuries against defendant. Defendant, an employer in extrahazardous
activity, pleaded the immunity proviso in the Workmen's Compensation
Act which provides "... that no action may be brought against any
employer or any workman under this title as a third person if, at the
time of the accident, such employer or such workman was in the course
of extrahazardous employment under this title .... "" In the depart-
mental hearing the Court assumed, as had the parties, that if plaintiff
could qualify for benefits under the Act his action was barred. The
only issue raised, therefore, was whether plaintiff could qualify for
coverage under the Act as a self-employed person with no employees.
RCW 51.32.030 gives any employer in extrahazardous activity the
option to qualify for personal benefits. The Court held the definition
of "employer" in the Act includes a self-employed employer without
employees; therefore his action is barred, despite the fact that he had
not made himself eligible for compensation.
On rehearing en banc the Court reversed, saying that an option to
qualify for compensation is insufficient to bar a personal injury action.
The Court pointed out that its earlier assumption that the action of
anyone who could qualify for benefits was barred resulted from a mis-
interpretation of Koreski v. Seattle Hardware Co.25 In the Koreski
case, a corporate official, who could have qualified to receive compen-
sation, but had not done so, was injured while installing an electric
motor. The tort action against a third party employer was held barred
by the immunity proviso. In the Latimer decision the Court stated
that the plaintiff in the Koreski case was a workman whose action was
barred for that reason. Since Latimer was not a workman, that rule
was inapplicable; and since he had not elected to qualify for personal
benefits under RCW 51.32.030 the immunity proviso left his personal
injury action unimpaired.
Since plaintiff, though without employees, was an employer and
since he was engaged in extrahazardous activity he was automatically
within the scope of the Act,27 and arguably is protected by the im-
munity provision from suits by any workman or employer in extra-
hazardous activity based on his own negligence whether he pays
premiums or not. But by the -decision in this case a self-employer who
24 RCW 5124.010.
28 17 Wn2d 421, 135 P2d 860 (1943).
28 A literal reading of the Act indicates a wbrkman is to have an absolute right to
compensation contrary to the indication in the Koreski case.
2? RCW 51.12.010 et seq.
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does not qualify for the benefits of the Act still has a cause of action
against third party tort-feasor workmen and employers, even though
they are covered by the Act.
The Court apparently confused two different parts of the Act and
overlooked others. The Court overlooked the fact that the Washington
Workmen's Compensation Act provides no option for any employer
engaged in extrahazardous employment to be or not to be within the
scope of the act; the employment is covered by compulsion."' This
has been recognized by the Court in the past when it said, "Our work-
men's compensation act, let us be reminded, is one under which neither
the employer nor the employee has any right of election as to whether
he will come under and be governed by its provisions, so far as extra-
hazardous employment is concerned." 9 In rejecting the rule that the
tort action of anyone who could qualify for compensation is barred by
the immunity provision, the court made no distinction between RCW
51.12.110 and RCW 51.32.030. RCW 51.12.110 is designed to enable
non-extrahazardous employers to come within the scope of the Act to
the extent of covering their workmen and preventing suit by the em-
ployer's workmen against the employer, but does not prevent suits by
third party employers or employees." RCW 51.32.030 is designed to
give employers already within the scope of the Act personal coverage
for injuries to their person if they so elect; it has no relation to im-
munity from suit. The Court has recognized this distinction as applied
to employers with employees. When an injured third party employee
attempted to sue an employer in extrahazardous activity with em-
ployees the Court held that the immunity proviso is a defense regard-
less of whether the employer has qualified to receive compensation
as an individual.3"
The primary source of confusion is the inclusion of the employer
without employees in the employer classification. The Court cannot
be criticized for this as the statute defining employer is so confusingly
drawn as to preclude a logical, rationally consistent construction." It
2
8 Ibid.
20 Shaughnessy v. Northland Steamship Co., 94 Wash. 325, 329, 162 Pac. 546, 547
(1917).30 Pryor v. Safeway Stores Inc., 196 Wash. 382, 83 P.2d 241 (1938).
31 Jewett v. Kerwood, 143 Wash. Dec. 639, 263 P.2d 830 (1953).
.12 RCW 51.08.070 defines employer; "'Employer' means any person, body of per-
sons, corporate or otherwise, and the legal representatives of a deceased employer, all
while engaged in this state in any extrahazardous work, by way of trade or business,
or who contracts with one or more workmen, the essence of which is the personal
labor of such workmen, in extrahazardous work." (Italics added.) The court has not
(MAY
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seems clear that an employer without employees comes within the
literal definition of employer.
The Latimer case held that an action by an employer without em-
ployees against a third party employer engaged in extrahazardous
activity is not barred unless plaintiff has elected personal coverage.
Does it follow that an employer with employees has an action unless
he elects personal coverage?8 Certainly the common understanding
is that nothing of this sort should occur,' but since the statute equates
employers with employees with employers without employees the Court
can hardly escape from extending the effects of the Latimer decision
to this situation. This decision would apparently bar an action by an
employer with employees only if the employer had elected personal
coverage under RCW 51.32.030. If this happens the immunity pro-
vision is made less effective because an employer with employees in
extrahazardous activity may sue another for injuries but may not be
sued for injuries inflicted by himself or his employees provided the
employer has paid his premiums and the, injuries occur in the scope
of the employment. A literal reading of the Act would indicate that
the employer in extrihazardous activity gains immunity from suit by
third party employers and employees by reason of his employment
alone. The Court, however, has by way of dictum, attached a condi-
tion to immunity; the employer must be paying premiums.' But it
should be noted that this condition is read into the Act.86
always followed a literal interpretation of this section. See Comment, 29 WAsH. L.
Rzv. 42, 43 (1954).
8s It is conceivable that an employer with employees could have actions it might
wish prosecuted, i.e., compensation for loss of services of a key employee injured by
third parties. E.g., Johnson v. Harris, 187 Okl. 239, 102 P.2d 940 (1940) is illustrative;
the employee recovered in his action and the employer recovered in a separate action.
Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 155 F.2d 992 (C.A. 3d 1946) based the employer's
right to recovery on common law. Many states do not permit the employer to sue for
loss of services of the employee unless a statute gives the right. E.g., Noblin v. Ran-
dolph Corp., 180 Va. 345, 23 S.E.2d 209 (1943) (complicated by wording of state
workmen's compensation act) ; some states limit recovery by the employer to losses
resulting from intentional harm to the employee; e.g., Crab Orchard Improvement Co.
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 115 F.2d 277 (C.A. 4th 1940) (dictum indicates that
negligence causing injury and loss is "too remote").
s"2 LAisoN, THnE LAw oF WORKMCENC'S COMPENSATION § 72.40 (1952), "Three
states have drawn a boundary-line not around the same employ ... but around the
entire membership of the state's compensation family. The consequences vary some-
what ... but they have in common the thought that the immunities ...should be
conceived of on a system-wide basis ... Washington goes the farthest of all. Neither
the employer nor the employee may sue any other employer or employee subject to
the compensation act."
s35 Jewett v. Kerwood, supra note 31. Larson, supra note 34, states, "... Washington,
starting with the broadest statute, has been assiduously cutting it down by interpretation
until it is difficult to recognize the original."
38 The statute once provided employers in default could not interpose the immunity
provision. L. 1927, c. 74, § 3. See, Reeder v. Crewes, 199 Wash. 40, 90 P.2d 267 (1939).
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The employer without employees creates a serious problem under
the Washington statute; the fundamental error appears to be the
definition of employer contained in the Act which permits employers
without employees to be classified as employers. Recognition of the
problem by the legislature will be the major step towards its solution. 7
JACK Ru xx
The provision has been omitted. L. 1947, c. 247, § 4 (d). Further, since an employer
with no employees is not obligated to pay premiums, he seemingly cannot be in default.
3 Solutions to this problem are difficult. A possible answer is to limit the immunity
provision to employers with employees, but this would require overruling another part
of the Latimer case as the Court clearly found the Washington statute to apply to
employers without employees. 40 Wn.2d 155, 159-162, 241 P.2d 923, 926-927 (1952).
Furthermore, the Court would be disregarding the statutory definition of employer.
But should the Court do this the employer without employees could not be covered
by the Act even by election and payment of premiums.
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